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sent? Do we have a right to ignore consent of the governed as an 
(an, not the) ultimate value simply by labelling their decision as 
morally obtuse or selfish or wrong? 
Perhaps Little Rock is an example of a terribly embarrassing 
but frequent event: that public discourse on moral issues does not 
produce the moral result that liberal intellectuals know to be right. 
The Supreme Court had initiated a public moral discourse in Brown 
and as the public became more and more engaged in that discourse 
in Little Rock and elsewhere, the public came to reject, not the 
principle, but the priority initially assigned to it by the Court. In 
short, Little Rock may be a perfect example of what the liberal 
proceduralist wing of constitutional interpretation says it wants, 
namely a public discourse initiated and guided by courts leading to 
a choice of policies consonant with public values.11 The trouble is 
that this particular discourse led to a choice of values and policies 
that the liberals don't like. Thus it becomes necessary to character-
ize it as a discourse that went astray, that lost its focus on moral 
questions and so reached a poor moral result. Those who are not 
liberal may prefer to characterize Little Rock as a true moral dis-
course that brought to light conflict between the ultimate values of 
consent and racial equality and yielded precisely that moral com-
promise which is to be expected and even applauded when two ulti-
mate moral values collide. 
THE BURDEN OF BROWN. By Raymond Wolters.1 
Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press. 1984. Pp. 
346. $24.95. 
Elaine W. Shoben 2 
The Burden of Brown by Raymond Walters is a long book with 
a very short message: integration is bad, but desegregation is not. 
The distinction between the two is crucial to Wolters's analysis. 
Desegregation is the prohibition of officially sanctioned separation 
of the races. Integration, on the other hand, is the compelled mix-
ing of the races for the sake of mixing. The "burden" of Brown v. 
Board of Education,3 according to Wolters, is that the Supreme 
II. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. 
L. REv. I (1979). 
I. Professor of History, University of Delaware. 
2. Professor of Law, University of Illinois. 
3. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
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Court has blurred this distinction and erroneously requires integra-
tion instead of merely prohibiting segregation. Wolters's thesis is 
that Brown had two prongs: one said that officially sanctioned sepa-
ration of the races offended the Constitution, the other that exclu-
sion of blacks from the company of whites caused psychological 
harm that also offended the Constitution. The fact that the 
Supreme Court interlocked these concepts led to a common usage 
of these terms as synonymous. It has also, Wolters says, led to trag-
ically misdirected attempts to reform the nation's schools by inte-
gration orders. 4 
Wolters seeks to support his thesis by tracing the effect of the 
court orders in the jurisdictions that were part of the original Brown 
companion lawsuits.s The narrative is painstakingly detailed, appar-
ently thorough, and occasionally engaging. As history it is interest-
ing, but it fails as proof that integration has harmed the nation's 
schools. As a tool to assist legal decisionmakers in formulating 
rights and remedies in the area of school desegregation, it is woe-
fully inadequate. Wolters succeeds instead in telling a fascinating 
tale of remedies law. His historical narrative inadvertently shows 
that the road from Brown was determined by the need for a mean-
ingful remedy for the constitutional right to the end of official 
school segregation. Unintentionally he tells a tale relevant not only 
to understanding the development of integration orders as an essen-
tial remedy to end official segregation, but also to an appreciation of 
new issues in civil rights remedies. 
I 
Wolters appears to have no quarrel with the decision that seg-
regation on the basis of race is unconstitutional. His disagreement 
is with the remedy. Thus his book really should have the less 
catchy title, The Burden of Brown IL Brown I was the original 1954 
Supreme Court opinion holding that segregated schools violate the 
equal protection guarantee. The question of appropriate relief was 
reserved until the next term. The result was Brown II, in which the 
Court articulated its famous command that segregated schools 
should be dismantled with "all deliberate speed."6 The Court de-
4. R. WOLTERS, THE BURDEN OF BROWN 7-8 (1984). 
5. There were three companion cases in Brown I. They were: Briggs v. Elliott from 
Clarendon County, South Carolina; Davis v. County School Board from Prince Edward 
County, Virginia; and Gebhan v. Belton from New Castle County, Delaware. A fourth case 
that became a companion case to Brown II was Bolling v. Sharpe from Washington, D.C. It 
had to be decided separately on substantive grounds as a fifth amendment claim, but was 
joined with the fourteenth amendment cases for the remedial decision. 
6. 349 u.s. 294, 301 (1955). 
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clined to follow the usual practice7 of ordering an immediate end to 
an unconstitutional practice because of the anticipated difficulties in 
the transition to desegregated schools. Thus the cases were re-
manded for an order to the school board in Topeka, Kansas, and to 
the school boards in the four companion suits, to make "a prompt 
and reasonable start toward full compliance"s with the elimination 
of segregated schools. 
Wolters decided to trace developments in the districts that 
were parties to the original Brown suit. In so doing, he chronicles 
accounts of resistance and adaption that ultimately resulted in 
schools that are as segregated today as they were in 1954. He con-
cludes that these histories reveal the "burden" of Brown: black 
school children are no better off in these districts today, while white 
school children go to segregated academies at great expense to their 
families.9 
Wolters wants his book to make a social scientific statement 
about the evil of judicial overreaching, 10 but his methodology does 
not support his conclusions. The scope of his study is necessarily 
narrow since only five school districts are examined. These five are 
hardly representative, nor could they be called randomly selected, 
precisely because they were carefully selected for test cases by black 
activists in the 1950's. As social science, then, this book is not very 
useful. 
Despite Wolters's failure to do what he set out to do, the book 
succeeds with a very different end. What Wolters has unwittingly 
done is to chronicle a fascinating tale of remedies law. How does a 
court enforce a constitutional right when the announcement of the 
right is met with mass resistance? How do trial courts contend with 
the task of making concrete orders to follow the nebulous command 
of Brown II? The book thus succeeds unintentionally in revealing 
the remedial logic of the evolution from desegregation orders to in-
tegration orders. Frustrated by ineffectual orders to end official seg-
regation, courts naturally began to take a greater role in dictating 
school boards' policies. When judges were reluctant to take that 
step, those in government charged with enforcing the end of official 
segregation cajoled them to do so. Aside from any desire that some 
judges or social activists may have had to create racial mix for its 
own sake,u racial mix orders ultimately became necessary to over-
7. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 639-
40 (2d ed. 1984). 
8. 349 U.S. at 300. 
9. R. WOLTERS, supra note 4, at 284-85. 
10. /d. at 275-76. 
11. Wolters's account of integration in Washington, D.C., emphasizes the liberal tone 
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come the resistance of school boards to meaningful open enrollment 
plans. 
This "accomplishment" of the book is ironic in light of 
Wolters's conclusion that the book reveals the error of integration 
orders as opposed to freedom of choice plans. Wolters's concluding 
paragraph argues that desegregation rather than integration should 
be accepted as the correct requirement of the equal protection 
clause. He asserts that when freedom of choice again prevails, the 
"[m]anagement of the public schools would then be returned to lo-
cal school boards and superintendents, and racial policies would be 
fashioned through the give-and-take of the democratic process." 
Optimistically he continues, "With every form of racial discrimina-
tion prohibited, local officials would almost certainly improve on 
the sorry record that disingenuous judges and naive educational re-
formers have made in the Brown school districts."I2 
One must wonder when the conclusion was written in relation 
to the work on the rest of the book. The narrative of the book, 
discussed more fully in the next section of this review, shows in-
stead that judicial reliance on the "democratic process" in school 
boards to secure nonracial assignment was virtually futile. The 
book thus underscores the familiar relationship between rights and 
remedies: a right without an effective remedy is a paper tiger. 
II 
In the early years after Brown, the courts did what Wolters 
advocates: they ordered school districts to cease official segrega-
tion. The question is what to do when a school board intentionally 
violates such a decree. Wolters generously assumes obedience, but 
his own account of mass resistance to the earliest desegregation or-
ders calls into question his optimism. 
Wolters's approach reflects little appreciation of the relation-
ship of rights to remedies. The right that Brown represents is, at 
least, a right to be free from officially sanctioned separation. When 
a school district has been found to have intentionally separated the 
of the opinions of Judge J. Skelly Wright. He finishes that chapter with the following 
conclusions: 
[Wright] was so committed to integration and so captivated by the sociological the-
ories then expounded by James S. Coleman that he could not Jet pass the opportu-
nity to impose his views on Washington's schools. Instead of assisting school 
administrators in their efforts to upgrade public education in Washington, he identi-
fied them with the evil he was contending against, destroyed them, and in the name 
of the Constitution delivered the school system to excesses of disorder and academic 
experimentation. 
/d. at 63. 
12. /d. at 288-89. 
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races in violation of this constitutional right, what remedy should 
follow? Wolters does not say. Presumably the remedy would be an 
order not to segregate anymore. But what if this order is 
disobeyed? 
Courts can and must do more than lament disobedience, of 
course. Under a freedom of choice desegregation plan, a court can 
require the school board to accept transfer applications from black 
students seeking to enter white schools. When orders are dis-
obeyed, courts have the contempt power, but contempt is more suit-
able to defiant individuals than to a body like a school board.13 
Moreover, criminal contempt sanctions serve only to punish defi-
ance; they do not secure the constitutional right. Damages could be 
awarded to students who were forced to wait for approval of their 
applications beyond a reasonable time.I4 But such remedies fall 
short of addressing the right of nonracial assignment to schools. 
How does one devise a court order that prohibits community har-
assment of black families seeking to send their children to the white 
schools? How should a judge devise an order to prevent racial as-
signment of children entering school for the first time? These reme-
dial problems for the very limited right of nonofficial segregation 
suggest that an affirmative integration order is the logical solution 
to force compliance on a recalcitrant school board. 
The point is that an affirmative integration order is useful even 
for the limited purpose of enforcing the end of official segregation. 
Beyond that, there is the question of using integration orders as re-
lief for children presently suffering the effects of past discriminatory 
school assignment.Is Last, and very likely least important in the 
history of integration orders, is the reference to the Kenneth Clark 
13. The contempt power has failed in many contexts to be a simple solution for disobe-
dience. Excellent reviews of the inherent difficulties with the contempt power can be found in 
Rendleman, Beyond Contempt: Obligors to Injunctions, 53 TEX. L. REv. 873 (1975); Dobbs, 
Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CoRNELL L. REv. 183 (1971). 
14. Monetary damages were not sought in any of the original Brown cases. In a 1973 
class action in Topeka, Kansas, a monetary remedy was sought in addition to a petition for 
an injunction to require integration. The district court denied the class action; eventually the 
individual claim was settled. That suit sparked the reopening of the original Brown case, 
however, because no final decree had been entered in the litigation that started twenty years 
earlier. The result of the 1950's litigation had been the assignment of students to neighbor-
hood schools. Plaintiff Linda Brown had been denied assignment to her neighborhood school 
on the basis of race. After the litigation, however, those neighborhood schools were over-
whelmingly attended by students of one race. The Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare [HEW] cited Topeka for violation of its guidelines in 1974, but the district court 
ruled that it retained exclusive jurisdiction over the issue. New orders to close some schools 
and to redistrict were made during the 1970's. Further Brown litigation was still pending in 
1983. R. WoLTERS, supra note 4, at 263-71. 
15. This aspect of civil rights injunctions has been very ably analyzed by Professor Fiss 
in 0. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978). 
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doll study in Brown I, which indicated that black children are psy-
chologically harmed by segregated schools. This last reason, so 
highlighted by Wolters, appears to be mere window-dressing.t61t is 
hard to take seriously the notion that if the Supreme Court became 
convinced that this theory of psychological harm is not scientifically 
valid, then the Court would undo integration orders.l7 More likely, 
integration orders would have developed to replace the freedom of 
choice plans even if the Supreme Court had never mentioned the 
Kenneth Clark study. Integration orders were natural and logical 
because they were the only remedy that was capable of effectively 
ending official segregation. 
Everyone is familiar with the stories of mass resistance in 
Prince Edward County, Virginia, and in Little Rock, Arkansas. In 
Prince Edward County, angry whites closed down the public school 
system entirely and sent their children to private academies.ts In 
Little Rock, federal troops were called in to secure the peace when a 
handful of black children tried to enter an all white school.t9 That 
resistance was sparked by orders requiring mere desegregation, not 
affirmative integration. 
Less well known is the revealing story of a quiet little town that 
was involved in one of the original Brown cases-Summerton, 
South Carolina.2o Summerton was a town of 1500 people in Claren-
don County, sixty-five miles from Charleston. It was a poor farm-
ing community with a high black population. Before Brown the 
16. Professor Kurland's theory is that the footnote referring to Dr. Clark's study was 
necessary in order to deal with P/essy v. Ferguson in some fashion other than overruling that 
contrary precedent. Kurland suggests that Brown I was written in a "shabby, disingenuous" 
way for the sake of achieving unanimity. Kurland, "Brown v. Board of Education Was the 
Beginning": The School Desegregation Cases in the United States Supreme Coun 1954-1979, 
1979 WASH. U. L. Q. 309, 317 (1979). Thus, with respect to Plessy, the Court wrote: 
"Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. 
Ferguson, this finding [that segregated schools adversely affect black children psychologically] 
is amply supported by modem authority. Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this 
finding is rejected." 347 U.S. at 494-95. Kurland maintains that the footnote was only to 
support the idea that psychology has advanced since the days of Plessy. His theory is that the 
Court wished to achieve unanimity by handling Plessy delicately. Kurland then adds a com-
ment: "It would take an extraordinarily sophisticated, or perhaps extraordinarily naive, ap-
proach to judicial behavior to believe that the cited literature [in the Clark footnote] was the 
cause of the Court's judgment rather than the result of it." Kurland, supra, at 318. 
17. An effort to relitigate the social scientific issue was rejected in litigation in Charles-
ton, South Carolina, brought shortly after Brown. The district court accepted the evidence, 
but ruled that stare decisis applied. R. WOLTERS, supra note 4, at 147-48. 
18. The history of Prince Edward County is included in Wolters's book because it was 
one of the original Brown companion cases. /d. at 65-127. 
19. Other constitutional issues involved in the fascinating tale of Little Rock are dis-
cussed in Farber, The Supreme Coun and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, 1982 
U. ILL. L. REV. 387. 
20. R. WOLTERS, supra note 4, 129-74. 
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schools were what Wolters describes as "separate and unequat."21 
The student-faculty ratio and the curriculum were much worse at 
the black schools, and so were the facilities. The white schools were 
built of brick and stucco, and they had indoor toilets and drinking 
fountains. The black schools were made of wood, and they had 
outhouses and buckets with dippers for drinking water. Moreover, 
the white children could take buses to school, while the black chil-
dren had to walk. The walk in this rural community could be for 
miles, sometimes past a closer white school to get to a black school. 
The Reverend J.A. DeLaine, who had himself walked ten miles 
to get to and from school as a child, was the moving force in the 
community. In response to an NAACP suggestion that the time 
had come to challenge the white-only busing policy, he found the 
families that were willing to be named as plaintiffs. The case of 
Briggs v. Elliott was filed in 1949 and eventually became one of the 
Brown companion cases. 
Wolters tells us that before the litigation was over, the families 
of the named plaintiffs suffered great economic hardship. The par-
ents of Briggs, who headed the list of plaintiffs, both lost their jobs, 
as did others. Credit was denied to others, so that they could not 
acquire the supplies needed to farm. Wolters quotes an observer 
who explained the squeeze this way, "[D]on't gin his cotton, don't 
renew his bank note, fire him from his job. This is reprisal for any-
one who wants to 'stir up trouble' and sign a petiti0n."22 An attor-
ney in town explained that he would neither rent land nor extend 
credit to any member of the NAACP because that organization was 
trying to destroy everything the white people of Summerton be-
lieved in. "We would like, if they are not satisfied here, for them to 
go where their ideas are accepted." Indeed, the Briggs family 
moved to New York. DeLaine moved to a nearby town, but ulti-
mately he went to New York. His church was burned; he was sued 
successfully for slander by a white principal; he was told to get out 
of town in ten days. This latter "request" was underscored by car-
loads of white men circling his neighborhood and firing gunshots 
into the air. DeLaine sent his family to safety, then stayed for the 
return of the angry caravan. He shot into the cars and killed a man. 
He was given asylum in New York by his church and lived the rest 
of his life in exile. 
Briggs v. Elliott originally challenged only the whites-only bus-
ing policy in Summerton. It was later amended to challenge the 
constitutionality of the racially separate schools, a theory the 
21. /d. at 131. 
22. /d. at 133. 
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NAACP was supporting in several selected suits. When Briggs v. 
Elliott came to trial, the NAACP-supported plaintiffs produced evi-
dence concerning the psychological harm that segregated schools 
does to black children. Among those testifying was Kenneth Clark, 
who explained his doll study. The attorneys for the county did not 
pay much attention to the psychological evidence because it seemed 
so inconsequential. They focused instead upon the abundance of 
legal precedent for the legality of segregation. The county conceded 
early in the litigation that the separate schools were unequal, how-
ever, and noted that the state was in the process of massive revamp-
ing and modernizing of the black schools. The three-judge district 
court ruled against the plaintiffs' theory that the equal protection 
clause prohibited segregation, and retained jurisdiction to review 
the periodic progress reports on the improved black schools.23 
Briggs became one of the Brown companion cases. After 
Brown II was decided in 1955, Briggs was remanded to the three-
judge district court with instructions to desegregate the Summerton 
public schools. Judge Parker then wrote the order interpreting 
Brown to mean that Summerton must proceed with "all deliberate 
speed" to operate its schools "on a racially nondiscriminatory ba-
sis." The order included a passage that came to be known as the 
Briggs dictum that the Supreme Court had not said that the states 
must mix persons of different races in the schools; it had only said 
that " a state may not deny to any person on account of race the 
right to attend any school that it maintains. "24 
The whites in Summerton, outnumbered one to ten by the 
black community, had no difficulty agreeing to resist the end of offi-
cial segregation. A meeting of 350 white townspeople debated clos-
ing the public schools altogether. One local leader, a former 
member of the General Assembly, successfully argued that the ap-
propriate tactic was delay. He explained that there could be 
twenty-five more years of "segregation time" in the South if meth-
ods of resistance were tested one at a time. The strategy was to try 
a plan for the maintenance of segregation until the court prohibited 
it. " 'When that is ruled out, another, then another, and another 
... until one is found that is acceptable.' " Then, he explained, 
closing the schools could be a last resort.2s 
Summerton schools remained completely segregated until 
1965-ten years after Briggs v. Elliott was decided in favor of the 
plaintiffs. The delay was attributable in part to the decision of the 
23. /d. at 134-39. 
24. 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (1955). 
25. R. WOLTERS, supra note 4, at 141-42. 
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NAACP to concentrate its efforts elsewhere. Thurgood Marshall, 
an NAACP activist at the time, had witnessed the white mood 
when he attended a meeting in Summerton in 1955.26 The NAACP 
turned its attention to nearby Charleston instead. Meanwhile, the 
Summerton activists had their own problems, as previously de-
scribed. No black child entered a white school in Summerton for 
ten years. "Unofficial" segregation successfully prevailed. 
The suit in nearby Charleston succeeded in achieving token de-
segregation in 1964. A year later Summerton followed with token 
enrollment of black children in white schools. That break finally 
came with a new lawsuit filed in 1960 by fifteen black parents, some 
of whom had been plaintiffs in the original suit. The district court 
judge found that the Summerton school board had made no sub-
stantial effort to comply with Brown and that the schools were being 
operated "in a discriminatory manner based exclusively upon the 
race of the students."27 Applications for transfer had been rou-
tinely denied to all black students. The judge ordered Summerton 
to admit the plaintiffs to the schools of their choice. By this time, 
1965, only nine of the forty-three children who were plaintiffs were 
still in school, and only five of those nine still wished to attend 
white schools. Those five were enrolled. 
Under Summerton's court-enforced freedom of choice plan af-
ter 1965, the schools retained their racial character. The black 
schools remained all black. The white schools were attended by all 
the white children and two percent of the black children. Because 
the ratio of blacks to white was so high in the town, those two per-
cent of black children comprised twelve percent of the students in 
the white schools. 
Wolters views this situation as nearly ideai.zs The white 
schools were attended by more than a token number of blacks. 
Those children were there at the affirmative request of their parents, 
and thus they were more likely to adjust well. The harassment of 
earlier years was virtually gone; some level of peaceful coexistence 
reigned in the white schools with a black minority. 
The problem is that this remedy fell short of enforcing the 
26. /d. at 145. 
27. /d. at 151. 
28. Wolters appears in part to endorse the "optimal mix" theory of desegregation in his 
conclusion. /d. at 273-89. He explains that theory earlier: "The theory of equal educational 
opportunity held that the best situation for effective desegregation was one in which blacks 
made up about 30 percent of the total number of students. In such an environment blacks 
could escape the effects of being socialized in a lower-class black culture without suffering at 
the same time from psychological isolation." /d. at 161. A major problem with this ap-
proach from a remedial perspective is how to choose which black children receive this rem-
edy, if it is indeed an effective one, and which do not. 
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right to the end of official segregation. Segregation was not over in 
the sense that schools ceased to be identified as "white schools" and 
"black schools." One could hardly consider official segregation to 
be ended until schools lost the racial identities that the school board 
had originally given them and still wanted them to have. Would the 
school board have accepted all the black applications if there were 
enough to threaten the white majority character of the "white" 
school? Or would they have been rejected on the ground that there 
was no room, without contemplating the possibility of a lottery for 
accommodating overselection of a white school? How would they 
have handled massive applications from black children at the entry 
level into the white school? Unless a court could be convinced that 
the school board would have responded to such circumstances with-
out considering the race of each child and the racial character of 
each school, it is impossible to say that official segregation has been 
replaced by "color blindness." 
In Summerton, official segregation finally ended in 1970. The 
Office of Education brought the Health, Education and Welfare 
[HEW] guidelines on compulsory integration to Summerton.29 The 
Supreme Court had decided in the 1968 case, Green v. County 
School Board ,Jo that affirmative integration orders could be an ap-
propriate remedy. This remedy was then introduced in Sum-
merton. The result was that all but six of Summerton's white 
students withdrew from the public schools. They enrolled instead 
in a Baptist parochial school that had been established in 1965, after 
the very first blacks were admitted to white schools.J' 
The white flight from Summerton's public schools was regret-
table, but predictable from experience in other communities. 
Wolters assails this result as resegregation that resulted in less racial 
mixing than there had been under the freedom of choice plan.32 
The resegregation was beyond the control of the court at that point 
because parents cannot be compelled to send their children to pub-
lic schools instead of private ones. But the final result did succeed 
in ending any remnant of official segregation: the school board no 
longer desired any individual school to have a particular racial 
character. Schools were "just schools."JJ The fact that virtually all 
29. Wolters notes at some length the irony that it was the Nixon administration that 
vigorously enforced the liberal HEW guidelines. Richard Nixon's campaign against Hubert 
Humphrey, Wolters notes, led the South to believe that Nixon was opposed to compulsory 
racially-mixed integration. /d. at 161-65. 
30. 391 u.s. 430 (1968). 
31. R. WOLTERS, supra note 4, at 165. 
32. /d. at 173-74. 
33. The Supreme Court used the phrase "just schools" in Green v. County School Bd.: 
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the students were black is fundamentally irrelevant to the right to 
end official segregation. It would be relevant only if the goal of the 
courts had been to maximize racial mixing, a goal Wolters rejects. 
The schools were now truly open. No other remedy could have 
cured the constitutionally offensive intention of the school board to 
preserve the racial character of the schools. Freedom of access only 
"worked" because of the correct perception of the population that 
certain schools were basically reserved to certain races; if any sub-
stantial number of blacks had taken advantage of the plan by apply-
ing to "white schools," white flight would surely have resulted. 
White flight was unfortunate, but was an inevitable result of any 
remedy that could have secured the right of blacks to truly open 
schools. 
III 
The remedial problems in school desegregation cases are not 
unlike those in employment discrimination cases. Consider the 
problem posed by the case of International Brotherhood of Team-
sters v. United States,34 a 1977 Supreme Court case concerning 
rights and remedies under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
In Teamsters a trucking company was found to have discriminated 
intentionally on the basis of race and national origin in the assign-
ment of jobs. Minorities were virtually all assigned to the less desir-
able job of city drivers, whereas the better over-the-road jobs were 
reserved for whites. The seniority lines were completely separate, 
so workers could not transfer to the desirable over-the-road jobs 
without losing accumulated seniority. Before the lawsuit, applica-
tions for transfers from minorities were automatically rejected. The 
trial court found intentional discrimination and ordered that appli-
cations for transfer be considered without regard to race or national 
The New Kent School Board's "freedom-of-choice" plan cannot be accepted as 
a sufficient step to "effectuate a transition" to a unitary system. In three years of 
operation not a single white child has chosen to attend Watkins school and 
although 115 Negro children enrolled in New Kent school in 1967 (up from 35 in 
1965 and 111 in 1966) 85% of the Negro children in the system still attend the all-
Negro Watkins school. In other words, the school system remains a dual system. 
Rather than further the dismantling of the dual system, the plan has operated sim-
ply to burden children and their parents with a responsibility which Brown II 
placed squarely on the School Board. The Board must be required to formulate a 
new plan and, in light of other courses which appear open to the Board, such as 
zoning, fashion steps which promise realistically to convert promptly to a system 
without a "white" school and a "Negro" school, but just schools. 
391 U.S. 430, 441-42 (1968) (footnote omitted). It is this case that Wolters considers anath-
ema because it changed the right from desegregation to integration. R WoLTERS, supra note 
4, at 7, 274-75. Green is more properly seen as merely a remedies case, struggling to find a 
way to enforce the previously announced right that schools may not be officially segregated. 
34. 431 u.s. 324 (1977). 
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ongm. The problem is that such a limited remedy alone is not suffi-
cient for current employees, only for future ones. Current minority 
employees could not take advantage of the right to transfer without 
losing seniority. Only the few with the least seniority to lose would 
be in a position to transfer. 
The older minority employees who were discriminatorily de-
nied the opportunity to transfer years ago are identifiable victims of 
past discrimination. To leave them without a more meaningful 
remedy would be a severe curtailment of the right not to suffer dis-
crimination in employment. The Supreme Court said that such 
identifiable victims could be granted retroactive seniority in the 
over-the-road line.Js If this remedy had not been provided, the 
over-the-road line would have been integrated by only a few young 
minorities; the basic character of the existing work force would 
have remained the same. The over-the-road drivers would have 
been racially identifiable as a white group of employees, and the 
older minority employees would still have been excluded. 
The analogy to school desegregation is that the end of official 
segregation is meaningless if the practical result is that schools keep 
their racial identities. The identifiable victims of past discrimina-
tion are the black children who were discriminatorily assigned to 
schools under official segregation. Most of their parents did not 
choose to take advantage of the court-ordered remedy that transfer 
to the white school was possible. Unless each of them actively pre-
ferred the school to which their children had originally been dis-
criminatorily assigned, the remedy was incomplete; in the absence 
of a constitutional violation, those students would have attended 
different schools. The reason for failure to apply for a school trans-
fer is unimportant. Although it was easy to identify seniority as the 
reason for not transferring lines in Teamsters, it should not be nec-
essary for the reason to be so easily identifiable. Fear of harassment 
is certainly a possibility, but it should not be necessary to prove it. 
Even if schools retain the racial character unconstitutionally im-
posed on them only because of inertia, their racial character is still 
attributable to the previous constitutional violation. The question is 
whether one believes that the identifiable victims have been put in 
the position that they would have occupied absent discrimination. 
If not, the remedy is incomplete. In such a case, the only way to 
end the continued presence of intentionally segregated schools is to 
order affirmative integration. 
This analogy is apt only for the remedies necessary to undo the 
continued desire of a school board to keep the racial character of 
35. /d. at 367-71. 
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previously segregated schools. It relates only to identifiable victims 
of immediately past discrimination. Once that problem has been 
cured and schools have lost their intentional racial character, con-
tinued integration orders no longer relate to identifiable victims. At 
that point integration orders would not be to remedy past inten-
tional discrimination, but would be mixing for the sake of racial 
mixture. Only then one can truly say that the right being enforced 
is different than the simple right to the end of official segregation. 
Another analogy to employment discrimination involves the 
current debate about affirmative action remedies for unidentified 
victims of discrimination. When an employer has been found to 
have discriminated in hiring, a court may order as a temporary rem-
edy that the excluded group be given preference in hiring. This 
remedy is not limited to identified victims of discrimination, but ex-
tends also to unidentified ones. In other words, the people who ben-
efit from the remedy are not necessarily the ones who suffered the 
loss of the right. The Supreme Court has upheld this remedy in 
some contexts,36 but is still considering its appropriate use. Most 
notably, a case currently pending before the Court concerns the use 
of this remedy in a consent decree by a state employer when there 
has been no finding of past discrimination.37 
In school desegregation cases, an order to integrate children 
who have never been the victims of intentional discrimination 
would be a remedy for those who have lost no right. The classic 
example is the racial disparity between cities and suburbs. Thera-
cial character of city and suburban schools usually is not the result 
of the desire of a school board or a state to segregate. The economic 
forces that caused such racial separation may be compatible with 
the wishes of officials, but they are not intentionally caused by 
them. 3s Wolters complains bitterly that this is a double standard 
for the North and the South,39 but to grant a remedy in such situa-
tions would be to change the right. In fact, it would be to create the 
very right that Wolters believes that equal protection clause does 
36. Compare United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (upholding 
voluntary affirmative action plan by private employer as not violative of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964) with Firefighters Local Union v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984) (reversing 
district court order that modified seniority provisions of consent decree to provide for benefit 
of unidentifiable victims of possible prior discrimination). 
37. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case that poses the questions left 
open by Stotts and Weber: Can a public employer adopt a racial preference for unidentifiable 
victims of possible past discrimination absent a finding of past intentional discrimination? 
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. ofEduc., 746 F.2d ll52 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S.Ct. 2015 
(1985). 
38. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
39. R. WOLTERS, supra note 4, 288. 
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not contain: the right to racial mixing in the schools solely because 
it causes harm to be separate for any reason. 
IV 
The nation's public schools have experienced considerable up-
heaval since Brown. Ending segregation has been painful. Many 
believe that the public schools have deteriorated in the past thirty 
years. There is a natural tendency to seek to fix blame for these 
problems. Wolters speaks for those who blame the Supreme Court 
for the upheaval and blame the deterioration on integration and lib-
eral educational reformers. 
The deterioration of schools, if it truly exists, is difficult to 
trace. Many factors may be responsible. The fact that it is believed 
to have followed Brown can hardly be conclusive proof that it was 
caused by Brown. Wolters purports to trace the decline of specific 
white schools to the influx of black students in the sixties and seven-
ties. Those decades were also a period of enormous upheaval for 
other reasons, most notably the Vietnam War and Watergate. So-
cial science cannot by its nature be an exact science, but surely one 
could do better by way of proof than this post hoc ergo propter hoc 
argument. Why not compare schools, for example, where integra-
tion was beginning in a particular period with those where integra-
tion had not yet begun? Objective criteria could be established, 
such as reduced test scores or the increase of graffiti on the walls, to 
test the hypothesis that integration was the cause of such changes. 
This proposed study is crude and fraught with difficulties, but it 
contrasts with Wolters's willingness to attribute unquestioningly 
such changes in the Brown communities to the courts. 40 
40. Compare Wolters's ancedotal account of the decline of P.S. du Pont High School in 
Wilmington, Delaware: 
There were disciplinary problems, however, as racial mixing increased in the 
wake of continuing white flight and black immigration. "It was almost as if there 
was something magic-or hellish-when the black enrollment reached 40 percent," 
recalled Jeanette McDonnal, the dean of girls at P.S. du Pont High School. "The 
black attitudes changed then, and the whites had reason to be frightened." Begin-
ning in the early 1960s there were frequent reports of petty extortion at P.S. du Pont 
as older black students demanded protection money from younger students of both 
races. Graffiti appeared on the school's previously immaculate buildings, refuse 
littered the grounds, and windows were smashed. More serious trouble erupted 
after police picked up two black youths for questioning about some obscenities that 
had been painted on a building. "They didn't pick up any honkies," one black 
student declared, "so we were going to repay them. We were going to mess with 
somebody on their side." Spotting a white boy and girl after school that day, a 
group of blacks sprang to the attack. "There's some honkies. Let's go get them," 
the black cried. The white girl reported, "The girls came running across the street. 
They kicked me, hit me, pulled my hair and broke my brassiere. About a dozen of 
them. Some boys came over and started on my boy friend, who was trying to help 
me. All I got was a black eye, a sti1f neck, and a sore head." 
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Wolters blames the upheaval over schools on judicial and ad-
ministrative activists who brought integration orders to replace 
freedom of choice plans. Wolters believes that without such judicial 
arrogance, school boards would improve upon the current condi-
tion of schools. As his own tales reveal, his conclusion is unsup-
ported by the history of desegregation resistance. Orders to end 
official segregation failed to provide an adequate remedy because 
segregation continued to be the intention of the school boards. 
Freedom of choice plans reflected only a concession that total segre-
gation was no longer possible; the schools kept the racial characters 
that the schools boards wanted them to have. Only integration or-
ders could combat such unconstitutional intention to segregate. 
The fact that in some places the result was resegregated education 
because of white flight is unfortunate but irrelevant. Only when the 
school boards ceased to govern schools that resembled the old offi-
cially segregated schools did official segregation end. 
Other scholars have identified other possible reasons why 
Brown caused upheaval in the schools. Professor Wilkinson blames 
the Supreme Court for taking so long to end the slow deliberateness 
of "all deliberate speed."4I Dean Bell blames parents for their racist 
response to any mixing of the races in schools. 42 Wolters, as we 
have seen, blames integration orders that replaced freedom of 
choice plans. 
Perhaps there is no blame to be fixed at all. It is possible that 
public schools are the same as they would have been had they re-
mained officially segregrated. Whatever the unknowable truth, it 
seems unlikely that Brown remedies could have successfully devel-
oped any other way. Once one accepts that official segregation of 
the races is offensive to the Constitution, enforcing that right be-
comes a remedial problem. 
Wolters's desire to turn back the clock and allow freedom of 
choice plans is understandable, but not helpful. First, the clock 
cannot be turned back; it is naive to think that it could. Second, 
even if we could redo history, it would be a mistake to freeze the 
development of school desegregation remedies with freedom of 
choice plans. To do so would be to countenance the intentional 
perpetuation of the vestiges of official segregation. The right to the 
end of official segregation would thus be left without an effective 
remedy. Rights without effective remedies are no rights at all. 
/d. at 191-92 (footnote references to two personal interviews omitted). 
41. Wilkinson, The Supreme Court and Southern School Desegregation, 1955-1970: A 
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